

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

5 March 1962

25X1

Copy No. 2/3 9

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200380001-1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200380001-1

5 March 1962


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Burma: Ne Win's government apparently intends to retain power for extended period. (*Page i*)
2. Congo: Efforts continue to bring about meeting between Adoula and Tshombé. (*Page ii*)
3. The situation in Laos. (*Page ii*)

25X1

25X1



25X1

25X1

5 Mar 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

5 March 1962


## DAILY BRIEF

Burma: The new government of Burma, headed by General Ne Win as chairman of the Union Revolutionary Committee (URC), apparently intends to retain power for an extended period. Unlike the Ne Win regime of 1958-60, which viewed its takeover of the government as a temporary expedient, this military government, in addition to scrapping the constitution, has dismissed all members of Parliament and warned political party leaders that they must collaborate with the new regime or face permanent banishment from public life. It has also abolished the elected governing bodies of the ethnic states, where most of the insurgent activity is located, and replaced them with its own appointees.

No opposition to the URC has yet emerged, but Ne Win's total disregard for constitutional procedures may arouse popular resentment and unite civilian politicians against him. Although there are many officers and soldiers from the ethnic minorities in the army, the army has announced its preparedness to meet any unrest resulting from the arrest of ethnic leaders.

Ne Win apparently has not yet decided what to do with former civilian leaders now under arrest; there are rumors he is considering a public trial on charges of crimes against the state. Ne Win's handling of this problem may have an important bearing on the effectiveness and durability of his administration. Despite U Nu's record of inept leadership and maladministration, he still commands nationwide popularity and veneration. [REDACTED]

25X1



25X1

25X1

Congo: Negotiations to bring Adoula and Tshombé together for a meeting are continuing, but the two sides remain far apart. Adoula, who is currently in northern Katanga to put his prestige behind the government's military buildup there, told Ambassador Gullion before he left Leopoldville that he was under pressure from extremists in the government and that he could not permit the Katanga impasse to continue much longer. He gave no indication of willingness to consider a new constitution for the Congo in discussions with Tshombé. He added that he has told the UN Command that unless the Katanga issue is resolved by 31 March, he will settle it by military means. UN chief representative Gardiner stated on 3 March that his organization would do everything possible to prevent the "folly" of Congolese military action in north Katanga.

Tshombé is still insisting on stringent guarantees for his personal safety from the central government before he will go to Leopoldville. The American consul in Elisabethville questions whether the general assurances given by the Adoula government on 2 March will be adequate, particularly since Adoula followed them up with a trip to the north Katanga military zone. Tshombé remains under pressure from die-hard opponents of Leopoldville, such as Interior Minister Munongo, who apparently are trying to undermine Tshombé's control of Katanga's political organizations.

25X1

25X1

Laos: Souvanna, still in Xieng Khouang to discuss with Souphannouvong the cabinet slate worked out during his recent Vientiane visit, has said he plans to return to Vientiane this coming week for further talks despite the absence of Phoumi, who is in Thailand for medical care. He anticipates that Souphannouvong will suggest some modifications of his cabinet proposals--which have the approval of the Western ambassadors but not of Phoumi--but will "in the end" accept them. Phoumi's counterproposal of a government composed of six functional councils under King Savang has been termed unacceptable by Souphannouvong.

25X1

25X1

5 Mar 62

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200380001-1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200380001-1



Situation in Burma

Rangoon is reported going about business as usual. General Ne Win on 3 March had a "friendly talk" with a visiting Chinese Communist trade delegation, headed by Peiping's Foreign Trade Minister Yeh Chi-chuang, which arrived in Rangoon on the eve of the army takeover. None of the nongovernmental leaders of Burma's various political parties and minority groups, except for profederalist Shans, has been arrested, and General Ne Win has called in party representatives for consultations on the country's future. Cabinet ministers representing the Chin, Karen, and Arakanese minorities, arrested in the 2 March roundup, have been released, as have Shan leaders who opposed the reorganization of Burma as a federal system. By chance the Kachin minister had been away, and no Kachins were arrested. In this calm, however, the military regime has moved rapidly to wipe out all vestiges of the former elective parliamentary government, of which General Ne Win had long been a leading advocate.

25X1 The takeover was probably motivated by an accumulation of grievances. The timing was auspicious for the army because, with the exception of two cabinet officers, all major political leaders were gathered in Rangoon for the parliamentary session. [ ] It appears probable also that not even all members of the URC were informed of the timing of the coup and that the action was based on long-standing army plans to meet political emergencies. Following this 1958 assumption of control, General Ne Win explained that he had acted on contingency plans drafted in 1950.

25X1 Principal among the causes of army concern for the future of Burma were the growing demand among the minorities, especially the Shans, for greater autonomy; the increasing strength of the minority insurgent forces in the countryside; the declining morale and efficiency of government administration; the stagnation of the national economy; the discontent of Burmese business interests; and the threatened fragmentation of the national political parties. [ ] In addition Ne Win may have been irritated by Nu's [ ]

25X1

[ ] plan to reactivate on a credit basis Soviet economic development proposals, which he had canceled in 1959, for an irrigation project and a national theater and sports arena.

The new government is likely to try to reactivate the domestic reform programs which Ne Win carried out in his previous administration and which the civilian administration subsequently scrapped. In doing so, however, it may face greater difficulties than it did in the past. Where formerly Ne Win had the grudging support of all political elements except the Communists, this time he has acted without their support and against their wishes. Despite the dissatisfaction of many elements of Burmese society with Nu's government, prior to the actual army takeover all political leaders were agreed in opposing a return to military rule. Moreover, by acting this time without Nu's blessing, Ne Win will find it more difficult to obtain active support from the mass of Burmese citizens. Ne Win's apparent failure to gain Nu's approval of his military regime, as shown by Nu's continued detention, confronts the new administration with an extremely delicate problem at the very outset. Nu's domestic and international standing may make him a rallying point for opposition. [ ]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

- Special Counsel to the President
- Military Representative of the President
- The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
- The Scientific Adviser to the President
- The Director of the Budget
- The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
- The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

- The Secretary of State
- The Under Secretary of State
- The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
- The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

- The Secretary of the Treasury
- The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

- The Secretary of Defense
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense
- The Secretary of the Army
- The Secretary of the Navy
- The Secretary of the Air Force
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense
- The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
- Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
- Chief of Staff, United States Army
- Commandant, United States Marine Corps
- U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
- Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
- Commander in Chief, Pacific
- The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- The Director, The Joint Staff
- The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
- The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
- The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
- The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

- The Attorney General
- The Federal Bureau of Investigation
- The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

- The Chairman

The National Security Agency


- The Director

The United States Information Agency

- The Director

The National Indications Center

- The Director



**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**